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NOTE
TAKE YOUR PAWS OFF ME: AN ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF REVISING THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT AND THE
PROTECTING AMERICA'S WORKERS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSH Act").' The purpose of this legislation was to secure "safe and
healthful working conditions" throughout the United States.2 Moreover,
the OSH Act established federal regulation of labor conditions by
forcing employers to provide their employees with a workplace free
from "recognized hazards to safety and health." 3 Among the hazards
Congress sought to eliminate were "exposure to toxic chemicals,
excessive noise levels, mechanical dangers, heat or cold stress, [and]
unsanitary conditions"4 The OSH Act also created two agencies, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") and the
National Institute for Safety and Health ("NIOSH").' NIOSH is tasked
with conducting research for OSHA,6 as well as "establish[ing]
recommended occupational safety and health standards." 7 OSHA is
subsumed by the U.S. Department of Labor and is responsible for
administration of the OSH Act throughout the various jurisdictions of
the United States.

1. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
2. Id. §651(b).
3. Summary of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/osha.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY]; see 29 U.S.C. §651(b).
4.

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.

5. See 29 U.S.C. § 671; see also U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supranote 3.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 671(d).
7. Id. § 671(c).
8.

See id.

§ 653(a);
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The OSH Act has remained largely unchanged since its inception.9
Additionally, the growth of the American workforce, in combination
with stagnant OSH1A reforms, has rendered OSHA largely ineffective.' 0
Recently, the Protecting America's Workers Act ("PAW Act")" has
been proposed as legislation to revamp OSHA.1 2 If enacted, this bill will
significantly increase the criminal and civil penalties for those
employers found to be in violation of the OSH Act.' 3 Moreover, the bill
also changes aspects of adjudication involving employer violations;
specifically, the bill gives employees a key role in litigation.14 Although
the proposed legislation would make several changes to the OSH Act,"
some critics of the bill believe that its penalties may be too burdensome
on employers.' 6 Specifically, one organization believes that sharp
increases in criminal penalties and workplace regulation may create

ABOUT OSHA 6 (2006), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/allabout OSHA.pdf.
9. OSHA Authority and Penalties Expected to Increase Greatly Under ProposedLegislation,
GIBSON

DuNN

(Apr.

30,

2009),

http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/OSHAAuthorityandPenaltiesProposedLegislation.aspx; see also Lynn Rhinehart, Workers At Risk: The Unfulfilled Promise of
the OccupationalSafety and Health Act, Ill W. VA. L. REv. 117, 118 (2008) ("In the nearly 40
years since the OSH Act's passage, the law has not been significantly amended or strengthened.").
10. AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 14-15, 18 (19th ed. 2010)
at
available
THE
JOB],
ON
DEATH
[hereinafter
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memoriallupload/dotj 2010.pdf.
11. H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. (2009).
12. Executive Council Statement on the ProtectingAmerica's Workers Act, AFL-CIO (Mar. 2,
2010), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ecO3032010i.cfn.
13. See H.R. 2067 §§ 310-311 (amending the civil and criminal penalties currently in effect in
the OSH Act to make the penalties much greater).
14. Compare Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-659, 666 (2006),
with H.R. 2067, §§ 306-311. The PAW Act gives employees a key role in litigation by allowing
them to challenge settlements reached between employer and OSHA. See H.R. 2067 §§ 306-307,
309-311. Under the OSH Act of 1970, employees have no meaningful input about settlements
between the administrative agency and their employer. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-659, 666.
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
16. See Paul Snyder, Bill Pitches Prison for Willful Workplace Violations, DAILY REP.
(Milwaukee), May 4, 2010, http://dailyreporter.com/blog/2010/05/04/bill-pitches-prison-for-willfulworkplace-violations; see also The Protecting America's Workers Act (S. 1580/ H.R. 2067) is
Unnecessary and Will Not Improve Workplace Safety, COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY (2010),
http://workingforsafety.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/CWSFactSheetonPAWA.pdf [hereinafter
COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY] (arguing that harsher penalties will trigger more litigation, which
will be costly for all involved, and that compliance officers will be spending time defending their
citations rather than inspecting workplaces); Letter from C. Christopher Patton, President, Am. Soc.
of Safety Eng'rs, to Lynn C. Woolsey, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections,
Committee on Educ. & Labor, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
http://oshspa.org/Documents/0427 10_PAWAWoolsey.pdf [hereinafter Letter from C. Christopher
Patton].
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obstacles for employers already in tumultuous economic conditions."
Additionally, critics cite the success of OSHA in persistently lowering
workplace injury, illness, and fatality rates as a reason to maintain the
status quo of the OSH Act.' 8 Finally, opponents argue that if the OSH
Act is to be changed, the focus of any revision should be on cooperative
prevention rather than on an increase in penalties.19
Concerns about health and safety in the workplace extend beyond
the borders of the United States.20 Abroad, many countries have recently
sought to implement legislation mandating prosecution and high fines
for breach of health and safety guidelines in the workplace. 2 1 In looking
to successful policies overseas, it is clear that legislation must be
implemented in order to improve stricter compliance with OSHA.
Part II of this note will discuss the history, development, expansion,
and weaknesses of OSHA as a federal agency. Part III will examine the
implementation of occupational safety and health legislation abroad.
Finally, Part IV of this note will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
the newly proposed PAW Act, including an assessment of occupational
safety and health legislation abroad, to find common ground between
conscientious employees and responsible employers.
II.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

A. The OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970
In order to understand the shortcomings of OSHA, it is important to
understand the development and expansion of the Administration as a
federal agency. The American workplace underwent monumental
changes during the Industrial Revolution.22 Prior to the Industrial
17.

See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16.

18. See id.; Snyder, supra note 16 (quoting Brian Turmail, spokesman for the Associated
General Contractors of America, who stated that the PAW Act ignores the successes of the OSHA
system).
19. See Letter from C. Christopher Patton, supra note 16, at 2; see also Snyder, supranote 16
(quoting a construction company president who stated that that an increase in penalties, including
potential jail time for violations, would strain the construction industry's relationship with OSHA).
20. See generally Legislative Texts on OSH: Country Index, INT'L LABOR ORG.,
http://staging2.ilo.org/legacy/english/protection/safework/cis/legosh/index.htm
(follow links for
Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and China to see examples of the workplace laws
of these countries).
21. See id (follow any of the hyperlinks to view occupational safety and health statutes from
various countries abroad).
22.

See PETER N. STEARNS & JOHN H. HINSHAw, THE ABC-CLIO

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

WORLD HISTORY

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 8

186

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:183

Revolution, the economic landscape had mainly consisted of manual and
animal labor. 23 However, this long tradition began to evaporate with the
24
Populations condensed around
advent of machinery and factories.
urban centers where factories sprang up, 2 5 and large amounts of
unskilled laborers were concentrated in close quarters with heavy
machinery and hazardous chemicals.26 Legislation regulating these
crowded, busy, and complex work areas was practically nonexistent, 2 7
and lax standards created a great deal of hazards.28 The workplace was
29
often overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and without emergency escapes.
30
A laborer would be expected to work twelve or more hours per day.
All of these conditions made it a common practice for laborers to lose
their lives at work.31 By the beginning of the twentieth century,
however, worker advocates were demanding more stringent legislation
to make the workplace safer.3 2
COMPANION TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION viii-ix, 280 (1996); IRWIN YELLOWITZ,
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1850-1900, at 3 (1977).
23. See STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at viii (explaining that labor in the production
of goods was restricted to the use of animals, the human body, and manual tools); see also
YELLOWITZ, supra note 22, at 3 (noting that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, the United States
was "basically [an] agricultural society, with minimal industrial activity and mechanization").
24. See STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at 264-265; see also YELLOWITZ, supra note
22, at 37-38, 44-45 (describing the displacement of skilled craftsman by unskilled laborers operating
machines).
25. STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at 266.
26. See id. at 4, 280; see also Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970: Its Passagewas
Perilous, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 18, 18 [hereinafter MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of
1970]; Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Regime, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 479, 501-02 (2009) (describing the "mechanization of work that
introduced new dangers to the low-wage workforce" that accompanied the Industrial Revolution).
27. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 1:1, at 2 (2010
ed.) (describing the first statutes passed in an attempt to regulate industrial safety at the end of the
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries as "cosmetic" and not "substantive"); see also
MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra note 26, at 19-21 (describing the movement that
resulted from the absence of labor laws).
28. See STEARNS & HINSHAW, supranote 22, at 4; see also MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of
1970, supranote 26, at 19-21.
29. See MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra note 26, at 19-21.
30. See STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at 112 ("In the early nineteenth century, most
industrial workers labored six days a week, twelve or more hours a day."); see also Haymarket
Marytrs, ILL. LAB. HIST. SoC'Y, http://www.kentlaw.edulilhs/haymkmon.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2010).
31. See MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra note 26, at 18-19.
32. See Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers' Safety and Health, 1877http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/monoOF
LABOR,
DEP'T
U.S.
1917,
regsafeintrotoc.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter MacLaury, Government Regulation of
Workers' Safety]; see also STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining how growing
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The hazardous work conditions that existed for decades were a
Laborers who were injured or
direct result of indifferent employers.
even lost their lives during the course of work were usually without
relief because no effective system of workers' compensation was in
place.34 Individual workers were able to sue in tort,35 but there were
many absolute defenses available to employers that prevented workers
from prevailing. 6 Additionally, workers rarely prevailed in tort lawsuits
because of overwhelming legal expenses.37 Furthermore, the idea of
criminal punishment or fines for an employer was relatively unheard
of.38 Thus, without adequate legislation regulating the workplace and
with very few, if any, penalties for violations of laws that were in place,
employers had no incentive to provide adequate working conditions.39
Labor reformers recognized that without incentives, employers
would never enforce safety precautions that would increase their costs of
business. 4 0 In response, reformers pushed for the creation of workers'

accident rates and a faster work pace compelled unions to push for worker protection); ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2-3 (listing various occupational and work safety statutes passed near the
turn of the century in response to industrialization); Rathod, supra note 26, at 501-02 ("With the
arrival of the industrial revolution ... the call for worker protections intensified.").
33. See STEARNS & HINSHAW, supra note 22, at 4-5; see also MacLaury, Government
Regulation of Workers' Safety, supra note 32; Elizabeth A. Lambrecht Karels, Make Employers
Accountable for Workplace Safety! How the Dirty Little Secret of Workers' Compensation Puts
Employees at Risk and Why Criminal Prosecution & Civil Action Will Save Lives and Money, 26
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 111, 118 (2004) (citing MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra
note 26, at 19).
34. MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra note 26, at 19.
35. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2; see also Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of
Workers'Compensation,19 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 106, 106-07 (1999).
36. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2 (explaining that recovery for injuries suffered
by employees at work was often blocked by the absolute defenses of assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule); Guyton, supra note 35, at 106 (referring to
contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk as "the 'unholly trinity of
defenses' (citation omitted)).
37. See Guyton, supranote 35, at 107.
38. See Rathod, supra note 26, at 502 (citations omitted); see also STEARNS & HINSHAW,
supra note 22, at 4 (explaining that during the early industrial period, prevailing views attributed
accidents in the workplace to workers and not to working conditions or to the employers);
MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supranote 26, at 18 (noting that "[m]any legislatures failed
to provide adequate funds for enforcement" of laws covering workplace hazards during the period
following the Civil War).
39. See STEARNS & HINSHAw, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that the only incentive for safety, if
any, was the risk accidents posed to damaging machinery and reducing production); see also
MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supra note 26, at 18.
40. See MacLaury, The Job Safety Law ofl 970, supranote 26, at 19.
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compensation laws, and the majority of states established these laws.41
Additionally, individual states created industrial commissions that had
the "authority to establish specific safety and health regulations.'A2
These commissions were successful in creating a compensation fund for
injured employees.4 3 The reformers theorized that if employers were to
bear the majority of economic costs associated with workplace injuries
and deaths, then a financial incentive would be created to prevent these
injuries and deaths." Under this system, employees who were injured at
work received compensation out of workers' compensation funds, which
were paid into by employers as insurance premiums.45 Therefore, the
fewer accidents that occurred in the workplace, the lower the premiums
employers would have to pay into the fund.46 At the same time, federal
legislation aimed directly at the large-scale regulation of private working
conditions did not come until much later.47
President Richard Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and Health
Act into law in 1970.48 The bill came in response to a Senate Report
from the same year that estimated that 14,500 Americans died annually
as a result of workplace accidents and injuries.49 The Senate Report also
indicated that lost wages due to injuries and deaths at workplaces totaled
$1.5 billion each year.50 Many considered these numbers unacceptable,
including former Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz, who, in the
hearings on the bill, referred to workplace accidents and their impact on
individuals and the American economy as the "grim current scene." 51

41. See id (discussing that most states had established a workers' compensation program by
1921); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2 ("By 1890, 21 states had passed occupational
safety and health laws, and by 1920, nearly every state had an industrial safety law.").
42. MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970, supranote 26, at 19.
43. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2; Guyton, supra note 35, at 108.
44. See Guyton, supra note 35, at 108 (noting that a primary financial incentive for employers
under the workers' compensation system is exemption from liability for tort claims stemming from
injuries covered by workers' compensation).
45. MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers' Safety, supra note 32, § 6; see Guyton,
supra note 35, at 108-09.
46. See Guyton, supra note 35, at 108-09.
47. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:1, at 2 ("At the federal level there was little
meaningful activity during this period.").
48. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
49. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 2 (1970); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:2, at 5 ("By the
lowest count, 2.2 million workers were disabled on the job each year, resulting in the loss of 250
million employee work days." (citing id. at 2)).
50. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 2 (estimating that the impact from industrial deaths and
disabilities was an $8 billion loss to the Gross National Product each year).
51. See id.; see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:2, at 5 ("In addition, the Public Health
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Additionally, the Report noted that various state compensation plans and
regulatory statutes were deemed ineffective in promoting health and
safety for American workers.52
The effect of the Act was widespread. First and foremost, it
provided a means for the federal government to regulate the American
workplace with respect to "occupational safety and health hazards."
Additionally, it provided an official federal statutory duty for an
employer to provide "each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."5 4
Moreover, the statute attempted to promote workplace safety by giving
OSHA two new methods of regulation: the ability to issue citations to
employers, which require the employers to correct unsafe working
conditions, 5 and criminal and civil penalties for violations, and failure
to correct violations, of the OSH Act.56
B. OSHA: Regulatingthe American Workplace
In order to understand the ineffectiveness of OSHA, it is important
to understand how the OSH Act imposes liability on employers. The
OSH Act sanctions employers by authorizing OSHA to impose
citations5 7 and civil and criminal penalties5 8 on those employers who
violate their statutory duties to employees under the OSH Act. Citations
are written documents that OSHA provides to employers, describing the
nature of the workplace violation and providing a "reasonable time for

Service estimated that there were 390,000 new occurrences of occupational disease each year.").
52. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 4.
53. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006); see also
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:4, at 8 (explaining that employers covered under the OSH Act must
abide by OSHA regulations).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:4, at 8-9.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 666; see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:4, at 10 (illustrating the various
civil citations that OSHA may issue to employers).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (giving the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representative the
authority to issue a citation to any employer who he believes has violated any regulations prescribed
by the OSH Act); see also ROTHSTEIN, supranote 27, § 1:4, at 9 (describing the citation process in
more detail).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (listing civil and criminal penalties imposed upon an employer for
violations of the OSH Act); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1:4 at 10 (itemizing the civil
penalties for violations of the OSH Act).
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the abatement of the violation."59 Civil penalties are fines levied against
an employer who has failed to comply with safety standards mandated
by the OSH Act. 6 0 The fines are divided into categories consisting of
"[w]illful or repeated" violations,61 "serious" violations,62 "not serious"
violations,63 "[f]ailure to correct [a] violation,"" and "[w]illful
violation[s] causing death to [an] employee."6 A "[w]illful violation"
issued against an employer for a worker's death is currently required for
criminal prosecution. 66 However, OSHA currently engages in the
practice of "downgrading the classification of citations from willful to
serious, which greatly reduces civil penalties and undermines the
possibility of criminal prosecution under the OSH Act [and i]n some
cases OSHA has utilized the practice of changing the characterization of
willful or repeat violations to 'unclassified."' 67 Many employers push
for "unclassified" violations in order to "lessen the impact of the
violations in any civil litigation and to keep willful or repeat violations
off their safety and health record." 68
It may be argued that part of the OSH Act's ineffectiveness stems
from the adjudication available to employers. Employers issued
citations or fines are hardly without remedy.6 9 In fact, an order of
abatement may be lifted because the employer has the right to contest a
citation in front of an administrative law judge.70 When an employer is
59. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a); see also ROTHSTEIN, supranote 27, § 15:1, at 458-59.

60. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:5, at 437-43 (noting that
the Occupational Safety and Health Commission has adopted a two-pronged standard for "willful"

violations because the OSH Act fails to provide a definition for a "willful violation").
62. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:3, at 429-30 ("[Tjhe finding
of a serious violation . . . requires 'a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm
could result."' (citation omitted)).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 666(c); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:2, at 428-29.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d); see also ROTHSTEIN, supranote 27, § 14:6, at 443-47.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:9, at 452-56.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:9, at 452-56 (discussing that
what constitutes a "willful" violation when the result is an employee's death is disputed between the
various circuit courts and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission).
67. Are OSHA's PenaltiesAdequate to Deter Health and Safety Violations?: HearingBefore
the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, 11Ith Cong. 33 (2009) [hereinafter Are OSHA's Penalties
Adequate] (prepared statement of Peg Seminario, Director, Safety and Health, AFL-CIO).
68. Id. at 34 (discussing the issuance of "unclassified" citations pursuant to negotiations
despite the absence of such a classification in the OSH Act); see also discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
69. See generally Karels, supra note 33, at 123-24 (discussing the options available to
business owners who choose to contest a citation).
70. Id. at 123 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977)).
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issued a citation, it must notify the Secretary of Labor within fifteen
days of its intention to formally challenge the citation.71 If the
notification is timely, the penalty or abatement order is stayed "until
there is a final order" of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission ("OSHRC").72 The employer may petition for review of
the citation before the OSHRC.73 An employer who is unsuccessful
before the OSHRC may again petition for judicial review before an
appellate court.74 Consequently, an order of abatement or citation may
be stayed for the duration of the appeal process if ordered by the court.
C. OSHA: Failures,Shortcomings, and Legislation
Congress passed the OSH Act with the goal of providing every
working American with a workplace that is free from preventable
hazards and dangers. However, nearly forty years after the OSH Act's
inception, thousands of American workers continue to die each year.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") places the preliminary number
at 4,340 work-related deaths for 2009.78 The deaths are caused by a
wide range of accidents, including falls, vehicular collisions, exposure to
harmful substances, and violent assaults. 79 These statistics inevitably
lead to the question: why do workplaces remain unsafe despite the
existence of OSHA? Critics and reformists point to several major
reasons that indicate why OSHA has failed to achieve its goal of worker
safety.

71. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §659(a).
72. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 13:2, at 410.
73. See 29 U.S.C. §659(c).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 19:1, at 579-80 (noting that
although decisions of the courts of appeals are final, either party may file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court).
75. See Serious OSHA Violations: Strategies for Breaking Dangerous Patterns: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Employment & Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health 24
[hereinafter Serious OSHA Violations] (prepared statement of Eric Frumin) (discussing the ability of

employers to appeal citations and simultaneously avoid compliance under OSHA).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
77. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL

INJURIES

IN

2009 (PRELIMINARY

RESULTS)

1,

1

(2010), available at

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.
78. Id.

79. See id. at 2.
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1. The Conflict Between Deterrence and Negotiation Policies
One problem many critics point to is OSHA's current negotiation
policy with offenders.80 Additionally, OSHA authorizes worksites to be
inspected periodically 8' and also when a violation has been reported or
suspected.82 Inspections may lead to the issuance of a citation, which
may be accompanied by a fine.83 However, the OSHA citation process
allows for settlement of these penalties.84
OSHA grants significant reductions in fines to employers in two
situations. First, the prompt correction of workplace safety violations
often results in the downgrade of a fine.s Second, agreement by the
employer to forgo legal challenges can also provide a successful means
to downgrade the classification of a citation. Although it may seem
that OSHA engages in these policies of negotiation to promote
compliance of offenders and efficiency of the citation process,
negotiation has profound negative effects on overall deterrence.87 This
negotiation policy, which often results in downgrading, has arguably
removed any fear employers have of significant punishment by the
federal government for violating regulations.

80. See Karels, supra note 33, at 134; see also Are OSHA's PenaltiesAdequate, supra note
67, at 33-34 (arguing that it is problematic to permit employers who commit the most egregious
violations of safety regulations to hide behind "unclassified" citations).
81. See 29 U.S.C. §657(a).
82. Id. §657(f)(1).
83. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 658(a), 659(a).
84. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.100(a) (2009); see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
at
available
(2002),
15
INSPECTIONS
OSHA
LABOR,
OF
U.S.
DEP'T
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha2098.pdf.
85. See Karels, supranote 33, at 134 (citation omitted).
86. See id.; see also Are OSHA's Penalties Adequate, supranote 67, at 33 (explaining that the
limited resources and personnel of OSHA create pressure to settle cases and avoid litigation);
Serious OSHA Violations, supra note 75, at 24 (emphasizing the ability of employers to challenge a
citation and avoid compulsion to comply for the extent of litigation).
87. See Karels, supra note 33, at 134; see also Are OSHA's Penalties Adequate, supra note
67, at 31 (arguing that $960 is not a sufficient fine for violations that pose a substantial probability
of death or serious bodily harm); MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR &
PENSIONS, I10TH CONG., DISCOUNTING DEATH: OSHA's FAILURE TO PUNISH SAFETY VIOLATIONS
THAT KILL WORKERS 5 (2008) [hereinafter DISCOUNTING DEATH] (noting that employers who
contest a penalty assessed by OSHA are more likely to receive a significant reduction in the civil
penalty than those who do not).
88. Karels, supra note 33, at 134; see DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 5 (stating that
the median penalty for a citation in 2007 was $5,900; the median final penal penalty following the
negotiation was $3,675; and the median final penalty assessed to employers was 38% lower than the
penalty initially assessed by the OSHA inspector); Are OSHA 's PenaltiesAdequate, supra note 67,
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The prevalence of downgrading citations works in combination
with the fact that OSHA penalties, prior to negotiation, are insufficient
to create deterrence. 89 For example, the criminal penalty for disturbing
wildlife on federal land is more severe than a violation designated as
"willful" under the OSH Act that results in an employee's death. 90 Thus,
OSHA penalties are initially weak. These sanctions are only further
weakened by a policy of compromise. 91
In addition to criminal citations, OSHA may also levy civil
penalties against an employer. 9 2 Civil penalties under the OSH Act were
last updated in 1990 as part of comprehensive budget reconciliation
legislation.
However, this revenue raising measure did not index
OSHA civil penalties for inflation. 94 As a result, OSHA's civil penalties
have lost a significant percent of their value since 1990 due to
inflation. Regular adjustment for inflation is in place for many other
laws pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvements Act of 1996.96
Interestingly, Congress specifically excluded OSHA from the act.9 7 As a
result, OSHA's civil penalties no longer reflect the graveness of the
violations.
Finally, the negotiation policy has had a negative impact on the
prosecution of employers. The high rate of negotiation resulting in
settlement has lead to an astoundingly small amount of prosecutions."
at 31 (arguing that larger fines are needed to "change employer behavior, improve workplace
conditions or deter future violations").
89. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 5 ("[OSHA's c]riminal and civil enforcement
tools are weak and ineffective."). See generally Rhinehart, supra note 9, at 123-26 (comparing
OSHA penalties to those of other federal statutes, and finding that the OSHA penalties are generally
much more lenient than penalties imposed for violations of environmental crimes or crimes against
animals, for example).
90. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 6. Compare Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 666a (2006), with Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e)
(2006) (highlighting that the former statute has a maximum penalty of one year of imprisonment,
while the latter has a maximum penalty of six months of imprisonment).
91. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 5 (noting that more than 20% of all penalties
involving an employee's death initially assessed as willful were downgraded by OSHA
supervisors).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 666.
93. DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 8; see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-29 (1990).
94.

See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 8.

95. See id.; Rhinehart, supra note 9, at 133 (citation omitted) (noting that current OSHA civil
penalties do not account for the fact that $1 in 1990 had the buying power of $1.66 in 2010).
96. Pub L. 104-134, § 31001(s)(1), i10 Stat. 1321-373 (1996).
97.

See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 8.

98. See

Criminal

Prosecutions

of
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From 1970 through 2002, there had been more than 200,000 workplace
deaths, 99 but OSHA referred only 151 of those cases involving willfulloo
violations to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.' 0 A
mere eight of those cases resulted in a prison sentence for "company
officials."10 2 More recently, from 2003 through 2008 OSHA referred
21.1%, or fifty, of its eligible cases to the Department of Justice for
prosecution. 103 Of the fifty cases referred, the Department of Justice
chose to pursue ten of those cases.10 4 Ultimately, prosecutions for
OSHA citations are few and far between, and those cases that are
The system's
prosecuted often result in inadequate penalties.'0o
inadequacy results in a lack of deterrence for employers.
2. Lack of Resources Equals a Lack of Compliance
OSHA is responsible for protecting 115 million private sector
employees and for inspecting eight million worksites.' 06 To undertake
this monumental task, the Administration was composed of a mere 2,147
employees in the fiscal year of 2009.107 In the same year, OSHA was
only able to undertake 39,057 inspections, covering just 1,332,583 of the
employees that it is responsible to protect. 0 8 As a result of gross
understaffing and the enormous amount of work that must be
undertaken, OSHA spends less than twenty hours on a case resulting
from a safety inspection.' 09 Perhaps most startling is the fact that a
federally regulated workplace can only expect to receive a single
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/workplace/osha/referrals.html (last visited Nov. 24
2010).
99. Id
100. See Reich v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 16 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir. 1994) (defining willful as
"an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, OSHA requirements" (quoting Ga. Elec. Co. v.
Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1979))); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, § 14:5, at 437-43
(discussing the definition of "willful" under the OSH Act).
101. PBS FRONTLINE, supranote 98.
102. Id.
103. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supranote 87, at 20.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 19.
106.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA FACTS (2008),

available at http://safetypartnersllc.com/Documents/OSHA%20Facts.pdf;

see also OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ALL ABOUT OSHA (2006), available at

http://www.osha.gov/Publications/allaboutOSHA.pdf
107.

DEATH ON THE JOB, supranote 10, at 68.

108.
109.

Id. at 60.
Id.
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regularly scheduled visit from an OSHA inspector approximately once
every 137 years.110
When taken in its entirety and divided among the total number of
workers for which OSHA is responsible, OSHA's 2010 fiscal budget of
$558,620,000.' breaks down to about $4.86112 per American worker.
Consequently, OSHA must protect one of its private workers with less
than five dollars per year.
3. Inaccurate Reports of Injuries and Illnesses
Data from the National Safety Council of Accident Facts and
Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") indicate that workplace illnesses and
injuries have been on a steady decline since OSHA's inception.' 13
However, there is significant debate over the accuracy of this trend.114
Critics assert that the government may be miscalculating work related
injuries and illnesses by as much as 69%."' This error in calculation by
the BLS may be due to several factors. First, the census conducted by
the BLS excludes a large number of workers, specifically, "selfemployed individuals," "farms with fewer than 11 employees,"
"employers regulated by other federal safety and health laws," "federal,
state and local government agencies," and "private household
110. Id. at 13 ("At its current staffing and inspection levels, it would take federal OSHA 137
years to inspect each workplace under its jurisdiction just once. In seven states (Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Dakota and Texas), it would take 150 years or more
for OSHA to pay a single visit to each workplace. In 18 states, it would take between 100 and 149
years to visit each workplace once. Inspection frequency is better in states with OSHA-approved
plans, yet still far from satisfactory. In these states, it would now take the state OSHAs a combined
63 years to inspect each worksite under state jurisdiction once.").
111. DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 68; see also News Release, Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Secretary Hilda L. Solis Presents U.S. Department of Labor
at
2010),
available
(Feb.
1,
Year
2011
Request
for
Fiscal
Budget
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=NEWSRELEASES&p id=I
7139.
112. This number was calculated by taking the total 2010 budget, approximately $559 million,
for federal OSHA and dividing it by the 115 million workers OSHA is responsible for covering.
113. See DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 8-12.
114. Jeremy Smerd, Federal Study Points to Widespread Underreporting of Injuries on the
Job, WORKFORCE MGMT. (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.workforce.com/section/news/article/federalstudy-points-widespread-underreporting-injuries.php.
115. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 110TH CONG., HIDDEN TRAGEDY:
UNDERREPORTING

OF WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES 2 (2008) [hereinafter HIDDEN

TRAGEDY]; see also DEATH ON TH4E
JOB, supra note 10, at 10 (citing Paul J. Leigh, James P. Marcin
& Ted R. Miller, An Estimate of the U.S. Government's Undercount of Nonfatal Occupational
Injuries,46 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 10 (2004)).
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workers."' 16 These "built-in exclusions" may eliminate as many as 20%
of workers from the BLS Annual Survey." 7
Second, the phenomenon of underreported worker injuries and
illnesses is perpetuated by numerous factors regarding the actual
employers and employees. Employers are aware that a high number of
reported injuries will adversely affect their ability to obtain government
contracts, increase their costs, and increase the possibility of being
selected for onsite inspection by OSHA."' Thus, OSHA indirectly
creates an incentive for employers to underreport injuries because the
administration relies heavily on injury reports to select sites for
inspections." 9 In addition to underreporting by employers, workers may
not report an accident or illness as well.120 Some workers are influenced
by economic incentives created by employers who reward groups of
employees who go "a certain number of days without an injury."'21
Other workers are discouraged from reporting because of fear of
retaliation or being "labeled as accident-prone" by employers.122
Finally, there is a segment of workers who simply do not know how to
report an injury or accident and utilize workers' compensation.123 This
is especially true for many foreign-born workers who lack knowledge
and fear deportation.124 Thus, both employers and workers have
incentives to underreport the occurrence of work related injury and
illness.
Congress has recently recognized the dilemma of underreporting by
providing funding for a number of initiatives to study its prevalence and
effects.1 25 Additionally, the Senate Labor Appropriations subcommittee
approved a final omnibus bill that provided $2,250,000 for research and

116.

DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 11; see also HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115, at

11.

117. DEATHONTHEJOB,supranote10,atll.
118. Id.; see also HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115, at 14-15.
119. See HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supranote 115, at 14 ("The higher an employer's rate [of injuries
and illnesses], the more likely the employer is to receive an OSHA inspection.").
120. See Smerd, supra note 114 ("[E]mployees often underreport injuries and illness for fear of
losing their job or being disciplined.").
121. See DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 11; see also HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115,
at 19-21.
122. DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 11; see also HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115, at

15-17.
123.
124.
125.

DEATH ON THE JOB, supranote 10, at 11; HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115, at 13-14.
DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 11.
Seeid.at 11-12.
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prevention of underreporting for fiscal year 2009.126 In addition, at the
request of committees from both the House and Senate, the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") launched a rigorous study on employer
injury record-keeping practices. 127 The GAO report acknowledged
Congress's concern that underreporting has become a problem directly
affecting OSHA's regulation of the American workplace. 12 8 Moreover,
the report states that OSHA's policy of providing injury and illness data
is in need of alteration. 12 9 The report suggests several reforms, including
a requirement for inspectors to interview workers regarding work-related
injury and illness during audits.130
OSHA agreed with the
recommendations of the report, and it "stated that it would move forward
to implement them." 3 ' Additional legislation, however, would be
necessary to ban employer practices that inhibit the accurate reporting of
workplace injury and illness. 132
4. The Need for New Legislation
Legislative action over the years has decreased the number of
OSHA staff and inspectors, while at the same time the number of
workplaces and workers under OSHA's authority has "more than
doubled."1 3 3 In 1980, OSHA was at its highest level of staffing, with a
total of 1,469 federal OSHA inspectors.13 4 At that time, there were
about fifteen OSHA inspectors for every one million workers. 135 By
2008, the number of federal OSHA inspectors had decreased to 936, a
ratio of about six-and-a-half inspectors per one million workers, the
lowest ratio in the history of the OSHA. 13 6 Additionally, new regulation
by OSHA was practically stopped during the eight years of the Bush
administration. 137 Not only was OSHA's staff reduced13 8 and new
126.
127.
HEALTH:
WORKER
128.

See id. at 12.
See id; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-10, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND
ENHANCING OSHA's RECORDS AUDIT PROCESS COULD IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF
INJURY AND ILLNESS DATA (2009) [hereinafter WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH].
See WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 127, at 22.

129. See id. at 22-23.
130. See id. at 23.
131. Id. at 23-24.
132.

See DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 12.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id
Id
Id. at 18.
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regulation put on hold, but the administration also took action to
withdraw dozens of regulations already in the regulatory agenda. 3 9
The Obama administration has taken steps to rebuild OSHA from
the slashes to its budget and regulations throughout the proceeding eight
years.14 0 For fiscal year 2010, the OSHA budget was increased by $51
million compared to the budget for fiscal year 2009,141 and 100 new
inspectors were hired.142 The fiscal year 2011 proposal asks for a $14
million increase in the budget and the hiring of twenty-five additional
inspectors.14 3 The administration is also taking steps to introduce new
regulation by supporting a measure that would require employers to
track and report "musculoskeletal disorders" to health officials.'" This
proposal is facing stiff opposition from big business and its chief
lobbyist, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.14 5
The most promising advance of the Obama Administration for
OSHA is the Protecting America's Workers Act ("PAW Act"). 4 6 The
OSH Act has been largely unchanged since its inception. 14 Conversely,
the PAW Act would radically change OSHA's ability to regulate the
American workplace.14 8 For example, the PAW Act proposes harsher
penalties for willful and repeat violations that result in serious bodily
injury or death.14 9 Specifically, the new act provides a potential ten-year
prison sentence for a willful violation resulting in an employee's death,
as opposed to the current potential penalty of a six-month prison
sentence.150 The PAW Act also proposes criminal penalties for willful

138. Id. at 68.
139. Id. at 18.
140. See John B. Judis, The Quiet Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://www.mr.com/article/politics/the-quiet-revolution; see also DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10,
at 18-19, 68.
141. Laura Walter, DOL FY 2010 Budget Includes Increased OSHA Funding, EHS TODAY
(May 8, 2009), http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/dol-fy-2010-budget-increased-osha-funding0508.
142. Laura Walter, DOL 2011 Budget Request Includes OSHA Increase, Focus on
Enforcement, EHS TODAY (Feb. 1, 2010), http://ehstoday.com/standards/oshaldol-budget-requestosha-increase-focus-enforcement-2414.
143. See id.; see also News Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., supra note 111.
144. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Business Opposes Work Safety Proposal,FIN. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2010, at 6.
145. See id.
146. Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. (2009).
147. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 9.
148. See id.
149. Id
150. Compare H.R. 2067 §311 (a)(1), with Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
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and repeat OSHA violations by providing a maximum five-year prison
sentence when the violation results in "serious bodily injury."
Moreover, this increase in sentencing makes willful and repeat OSHA
violations felonies rather than misdemeanors, thereby increasing the
likelihood of prosecution by the Department of Justice.152 Under the
PAW Act, there would also be a large increase in criminal fines for
willful and repeat OSHA violations resulting in serious bodily injury or
death.'15 Currently, the maximum fine is $70,000.154 Under the PAW
Act, the maximum would increase to $250,000 for individuals15 5 and
$500,000 for corporations. 156
The PAW Act proposes several other reforms. One aspect of the
bill includes an increase in civil penalties for employers with more than
twenty-five employees.1 5 7 Willful and repeat citations resulting in a
worker's death or serious bodily injury would lead to a maximum civil
penalty of $250,000."' Additionally, the bill indexes civil penalties to
the Consumer Price Index to account for inflation. 159 Furthermore, the
bill eliminates "unclassified" citations, effectively ending the relabeling
of willful or repeat violations in negotiations.160
The PAW Act suggests important changes in other areas of OSHA
besides criminal and civil penalties. For example, the PAW Act would
allow employees to challenge OSHA citations, demand higher penalties,
and request more severe classifications than those issued by the initial
assessment. 16 1 Finally, the PAW Act would displace other federal
agencies' regulation of workplace safety unless they obtain OSHA

U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006).
151. H.R.2067§311(a)(5).
152.

GIBSON DUNN, supra note 9.

153. H.R. 2067 § 311(a)(1). The proposed bill punished violators in accordance with 18
U.S.C. §3571 (2006), which allows for much larger fines than the OSH Act of 1970.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3).
156. 18 U.S.C. §3571(c)(3).
157. H.R. 2067 § 310(a)(1)(C).
158. Id.
159. H.R. 2067 § 310(b) ("Amounts provided ... shall be adjusted by the Secretary at least
once during each 4-year period to account for the percentage increase or decrease in the Consumer
Price Index. . .").
160. Id. § 305 ("The Secretary may not designate a citation ... as an unclassified citation.");
see also GImsoN DUNN, supranote 9.
161. See H.R. 2067 §§ 306-307. Currently, employees only have the right to challenge a
deadline set for compliance with an order of abatement. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (2006).
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"certification."l 62 Essentially, OSHA would be the regulating force for
workplaces of many private companies that are currently regulated by
some other federal agency.163 While the PAW Act proposes an increase
in enforcement, we must look to occupational safety legislation abroad
for guidance on how to best effectuate the proposed bill.
III. HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION ABROAD
Concerns about health and safety in the workplace go beyond the
borders of the United States. 16 In fact, many jurisdictions have recently
implemented legislation seeking stricter compliance with health and
safety guidelines in the workplace. 165 Because the PAW Act fails to take
into account certain key aspects needed to fix the ineffectiveness of
OSHA, 166 it is useful to consider the successful policies of comparable
overseas jurisdictions and their recent legislative developments to
determine how the United States may improve compliance with
OSHA.167 A breach of health and safety guidelines abroad may result in
an unlimited fine, prosecution, and the possibility of the government
stepping in to close down the workplace, compared to the less harsh
penalties under OSHA in the United States.
A. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has implemented legislation in order to
increase the maximum penalties applicable to certain offenses relating to
an employee's health and safety in the workplace.168 The Health and
Safety (Offences) Act 2008 ("Offences Act") was implemented to
"satisfy the demands of those who have long campaigned for higher

162. See H.R. 2067 § 102; GIBSON DUNN, supra note 9.
163. See id. Examples of private companies that would become regulated by OSHA are those
currently under the regulations of the Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration and
Federal Railroad Administration. See GIBSON DUNN, supranote 9.
164. See Legislative Texts on OSH, supra note 20 (noting that countries such as Canada,
Romania, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland have implemented legislation concerning
health and safety in the workplace) (follow links for each individual country).
165. See id. (follow links for Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and China).
166. See supra Part H.C.4.
167. The legislative models for occupational health and safety of the United Kingdom and
Australia were used because of the cultural similarities between those two countries and the United
States.
168. See Health and Safety (Offences) Act, 2008, c. 20, § 1, sch. I (U.K.).
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penalties to be imposed for conduct which creates a risk of personal
injury to workers or the general public."1 69 The Offences Act is the
second major development from the United Kingdom over the past three
years regarding health and safety in the workplace, following closely on
the implementation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate
Homicide Act 2007 ("CMCHA").ve However, the CMCHA applies
only to fatal accidents in the workplace,"' while the new Offences Act
may apply to all accidents within a workplace.1 72 The Offences Act
"increases penalties for offences charged under the Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974, and its effect is in addition to the corporate
manslaughter legislation."l 73 According to Keith Hill, the member of
Parliament who introduced the Bill, there were three main goals for
increased penalties for health and safety violations: "tougher, more
commensurate punishment, more effective deterrence, and greater
efficiency in the dispensation of justice."l74
1.

The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 & Northern Ireland's
Health and Safety at Work Order 1978

The Offences Act seeks to impose harsher sanctions for offenses set
out under Great Britain's Health and Safety at Work Act 1974175
("Health and Safety at Work Act 1974") and the Northern Ireland's
Health and Safety at Work Order 1978176 ("Health and Safety at Work
Order 1978").177 These two pieces of legislation govern occupational
169. See Brenda Barrett, The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, 38 INDUS. L.J. 73, 73
(2009).
170. Id. at 79; see Health and Safety (Offences) Act, 2008, c. 20, § 1 (U.K.); Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, § 1 (U.K.).
171. See U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING THE CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER AND
CORPORATE
HOMICIDE
ACT
2007,
at
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/manslaughterhomicideact07.pdf
172. Kirsty Gomersal, On the Safe Side: Corporate Manslaughter and Health and Safety
Offences, BUILDING.CO.UK (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.building.co.uk/legal/on-the-safe-sidecorporate-manslaughter-and-health-and-safety-offences/3132508.article; see CATHERINE CLARKE,
ASHURST LONDON, WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY: NEW LAW GETS TOUGH ON OFFENDERS 1
(2009), availableat http://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id Content=4157.
173. Gomersal, supra note 172.
174. Barrett, supra note 169, at 75 (citation omitted).
175. Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, c. 37 (U.K.).
176. Health and Safety at Work Order 1978 (S.I. 1039/1978) (Ir.).
177. The Health and Safety (Offences) Act does not introduce any new crimes, but rather seeks
to impose penalties for crimes that already exist. See HBJ GATELEY WAREING, EMPLOYMENT LAW
UPDATE
FOR
LATE
FEBRUARY
2009
pt.
3
(2009),
available
at
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health and safety in the United Kingdom. Prior to the enactment of the
Offences Act, individuals in the workplace did not face prison sentences
unless they were charged with manslaughter.' 78 Additionally, courts
were unable to prosecute employers, since custodial sentences were
"only an option in the Magistrates' Court for failure to comply with an
improvement or prohibition notice or with a court remedy order, and for
offshore offences." 7 9
The sanctions imposed under the Health and Safety at Work Act
1974 and Northern Ireland's Health and Safety at Work Order 1978 are
very similar to OSHA in that courts imposed ineffectively low monetary
fines as opposed to prosecuting those who breach the statute. 80 For
example, in October 2008, "a worker [in London] was fined £2,500 after
an accident he caused by cutting corners left a member of the public
Thus, harsher penalties were needed in order to "deter
dead."' 8
businesses that do not take their health and safety management
responsibilities seriously and further encourage employers and others to
comply with the law."' 82 The harsher penalties also were implemented
to deal with those businesses that "gain commercial advantage[s] over
competitors by failing to comply with health and safety law and who put
workers and the public at risk." 8 1

http://www.employmentforum.co.uk/Images/DBImages/Search/GateWay/20Employment%2OLate
st%20-%2OLate%February/o202009..doc.
178. See Gomersal, supra note 172. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 states that "[i]t
shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety
and welfare at work of all his employees." Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, c. 37, § 2(1). The
Act goes on to state that "[i]t shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such
a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may
be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety." Health and Safety at
Work Act, 1974, c. 37, § 3(1). Articles 4 and 5 of Northern Ireland's Health and Safety at Work
Order 1978 contain almost identical language. See Health and Safety at Work Order 1978 (S.I.
1039/1978) (Ir.) arts. 4-5.
179. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 2.
180. Compare Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, c. 37. § 33(2) (U.K.), and Health and
Safety at Work Order 1978 (S.I. 1039/1978) (Ir.) art. 19, T 1, with Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006) (comparing relevant sections that only impose a fine under
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, preclude per se civil or criminal liability for a failure to
follow the Health and Safety at Work Order 1978, and the rare possibility of criminal prosecution
under OSHA).
181. See Gomersal, supra note 172.
182. HBJ GATELEY WAREING, supra note 177, pt. 3 (quoting Lord McKenzie, Dep't of Work
& Pensions Minister).
183. Id. (quoting Judith Hackitt, Chair of the Health & Safety Executive).
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2. Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008
The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 raises the maximum
penalties available to courts with regard to health and safety offenses
under Great Britain's Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Northern
Ireland's Health and Safety at Work Order 1978.184 The Offences Act
also extends the option of imprisonment to senior managers and
directors of companies.185 Judith Hackitt, 186 the Chair of the Health and
Safety Executive ("HSE"),187 explained the Offences Act as follows:
It is right that there should be a real deterrent to those businesses and
individuals that do not take their health and safety responsibilities
seriously. Everyone has the right to work in an environment where
risks to their health and safety are properly managed, and employers
have a duty in law to deliver this.' 88
The Offences Act makes three major changes to previous
legislation.189 The first change is that the Offences Act amends the
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 to give courts the power to
prosecute employers by imposing a potential prison sentence, with a
maximum of a two-year sentence for health and safety offenses in the
workplace.' 90 Fines were almost always the maximum punishment a
court could impose under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.191
Additionally, no matter what position a person holds within the

184. See CLARKE, supranote 172, at 1.
185. Barrett, supra note 175, at 79; see Health and Safety (Offences) Act, 2008, c. 20, § 1, sch.
2 (U.K.).
186. See Profile of Judith E. Hackitt CBE, HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE,
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/hseboard/biographies/board/hackitt.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
187. The HSE is the body responsible for regulating and enforcing the Offences Act. See
HSE s Work, HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/hseswork.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2010).
188. News Release, Health & Safety Executive, The Health and Safety Offences Act 2008:
HSE Chair Judith Hackitt Welcomes Tougher Penalties (Jan. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2009/e09011.htm.
189. See CLARKE, supra note 172, at 1.
190. Health and Safety (Offences) Act, 2008, c. 20, § 1, sch. 2 (U.K.); see David Young,
Employers Face Prison Over Health and Safety Offences, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (Jan. 21, 2009, 6:36
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/doctorbiz/429905 1/Employers-face-prisonover-health-and-safety-offences.html.
191.

See

Model

Examples,

HEALTH

&

SAFETY

http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/sentencing-examples.htm
18, 2010).
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workplace, whether an administrator or a general employee, the
individual may be prosecuted under section 7 of the Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974 if he or she fails "to take reasonable care for the health
and safety of himself and of other persons who may be affected by his
acts or omissions at work."1 9 2 Further, the Offences Act seeks to
prosecute employers, directors, and managers where the offense is
attributed to their neglect, consent or connivance.193
In contrast, employees in the United States do not have this same
responsibility.194 The only responsibility required of employees by
OSHA is to comply with all OSHA requirements under the Act that are
applicable.' 95 OSHA in the United States does not seek to sanction
individual employees.' 96 Similarly, under the Health and Safety at Work
Act 1974, liability will not attach to an individual solely because the
individual has a senior role in the company; rather, courts will
specifically focus on managers and directors with particular health and
safety responsibilities.' 9 7
The second change the Offences Act made to previous legislation is
that it made certain offenses that were previously limited to be triable in
Magistrate Court "triable in either Magistrate[] Court or the Crown
Court."' 98 The Crown Court has the discretion and power to impose
higher fines and custodial sentences,199 and "by extending the [larger]
maximum fine . . . and making imprisonment an option [in the lower

courts,] the effect of the new Act is likely to be that more cases will be
resolved in the lower courts." 2 00
192. See Health and Safety at Work etc Act, 1974, c. 37, § 7 (U.K.).
193. See Young, supra note 190 ("[T]he [Offences] Act creates the threat of imprisonment for
all employees who may have contributed to a health and safety offence by their, consent,
connivance or neglect."); Proceedings Against Director, Manager, Secretary or Other Similar
Officer,

HEALTH

&

SAFETY

EXECUTIVE,

(last
http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/investigation/identifying-directors.htm
visited Dec. 18, 2010).
194. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (2006). OSHA
regulates by targeting and issuing citations to employers, rather than individual employees, who
violate standards of health and safety. See id.
195. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OHSA:
(2003),
available
at
RIGHTS
15
EMPLOYEE
WORKPLACE

http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf.
196. See id.
197. See CLARKE, supra note 172, at 2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2; see also Lucie Ponting, The Offences Act: Shades of the PrisonHouse?, HEALTH
&

SAFETY

AT

WORK

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol28/iss1/8
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(Dec.
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The final change the Offences Act made to previous legislation was
to increase the maximum fine for breaches of any regulation under the
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 in the Magistrate Court from
E5,000 to E20,000.201 Many criticized the previous punishment as being
inconsequential for those who broke the law.202 Finally, the Offences
Act also penalizes employers for "offences which undermine the ability
of enforcers to regulate health and safety, to prevent harm or to
investigate what may be a serious health and safety offence."203
The Offences Act, however, is not without criticism.
Commentators and critics have recognized the potential for abuse
surrounding the prosecution of individuals under the new legislation. 20
Although there is growing anxiety surrounding overzealous prosecution
practices, Keith Hill, the member of Parliament who introduced the bill,
suggested that "the best estimates are that the new provisions will only
raise the number of those imprisoned each year from around three or
four to six or eight." 2 05
With respect to workplace violations causing death, the Sentencing
Guidelines Council has published a definitive guideline for these types
of offences entitled "Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety
Offences Causing Death."206 The panel instructs that judges must take
into account certain key factors in making the determination about
207
The panel advises that
whether an individual should be prosecuted.
seriousness should ordinarily be assessed first by asking how foreseeable
the serious injury was, and the more foreseeable it was, the greater the
penalty. 2 08 Next, judges are instructed to ask how far short of the
applicable standard the defendant fell and how common the kind of
breach is in the organization.209 This can be determined by assessing
Magistrate
http://www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/hsw/content/offences-act-shades-prison-house.
judges have expressed that on many occasions they referred occupational safety cases up to the
Crown Court "to ensure a punishment that better fits the crime." Id. By referring these cases to the
higher court, they in essence slowed down the judicial process. Id.
201. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 1.
202. See Barrett, supra note 169, at 75.
203. See CLARKE, supra note 172, at 1.
204. See Ponting,supranote 200.
205. Id.
206. CorporateManslaughter: Relevant Sentencing Guidelines, THE CROWN PROSECUTION
(last
SERVICE, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legallsto-u/sentencingmanual/corporate-manslaughter
visited Dec. 18, 2010) [hereinafter CorporateManslaughter].
207. See id
208. Id.
209. Id
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how widespread the non-compliance was. 210 Factors for this part of the
analysis include whether the event "was isolated in extent or indicative
of a systematic departure from good practice across the defendant[']s
operations." 21' The last part to this analysis asks how far up the
organization the breach goes.212
Typically, the "higher up" the
organization, the more serious the penalty is. 2 13
Additionally, the Health and Safety Executive policy statement
makes clear that prosecutions will not be taken lightly.2 14 The Health
and Safety Executive only seeks to prosecute individuals for breaches of
the health and safety guidelines which reflect "serious neglect; reckless
disregard for health and safety requirements; repeated breaches which
create significant risks; false information [provided to the Health and
Safety Executive by an employer;] and serious risks which have been
deliberately created to increase [employer] profit." 2 15 As the Health and
Safety Executive Chairman explains:
Our message to the many employers who do manage health and safety
well is that they have nothing to fear from this change in law. There
are no new duties on employers or businesses, and HSE is not
changing its approach to how it enforces health and safety law. We
will retain the important safeguards that ensure that our inspectors use
their powers sensibly and proportionately. We will continue to target
those who knowingly cut corners, put lives at risk and who gain
commercial advantage over competitors by failing to comply with the
law.2 16
Thus, it is clear that the new legislation does not seek to make an
example of all employers. At most, it seeks to punish those who
continuously breach health and safety guidelines, and those responsible
for the most serious breaches of occupational health and safety.2 17
Additionally, the Offences Act is unlikely to significantly increase the
number or length of imprisonments because magistrates have long had
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

214.

HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT 3 (2009), available

at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse41.pdf ("HSE believes in firm but fair enforcement of health
and safety law.").
215. Young, supra note 190.
216. News Release, Health & Safety Executive, supranote 188.
217. See id.
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the option of issuing prison sentences for the most serious breaches. 2 18 It
was noted in the House of Commons Workplace Health and Safety
Follow-Up Report that it is "hard to envisage [udges] suddenly availing
themselves of custodial sentences for lesser offences." 2 19
Similarly, in the United States, OSHA has the power of imposing a
prison sentence for the most serious of breaches pertaining to
occupational health and safety, but this option is rarely utilized.220 In the
proposed PAW legislation, it would be useful for the United States to
avail itself the option of prosecution more frequently, as the absence of
prosecution has clearly not helped the number of accidents and deaths in
the workplace.22 1
i. Burden of Proof
In the United Kingdom, the implementation of tougher sentencing
powers, which permit the imprisonment of individuals with a reverse
burden of proof on defendants, may cause an issue under European
human rights law. Section 40 of the Health and Safety at Work Act
1974 imposes a reverse burden of proof on defendants where an
individual is alleged to have breached occupational health and safety
guidelines in the United Kingdom. 222 That is, an employer is "assumed
to be at fault unless they can prove otherwise."223 This reverse standard
of proof is not applicable to Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"), which requires a presumption of innocence.2 24
The presumption of innocence standard is identical to that of the
United States. 2 25 The standard holds that in a criminal proceeding, the

218.

WORK & PENSIONS COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY:

33 (2009) (citation omitted), available at
FOLLOW-UP REPORT, FOURTH REPORT OF 2008-9,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmworpen/635/635i.pdf
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. See supra Part II.C. 1.
221. See supra Part II.C.I.
222. See Brenda Barrett, Whose Burden ofProof?, 38 INDuS. L.J. 215, 219 (2009).
223. Ponting, supranote 200.
224.

See RACHAEL HISTED, DLA PIPER, THE NEW HEALTH AND SAFETY (OFFENCES) ACT

2008, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/944f7cb4-ed5e-4869bfl5-02a64348e83e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8f7583de-41b9-43dl-93cb15426625f8be/The%2oNew/o2oHealth%20and%2OSafety/o20(Offences)%2OAct/ 202008.pub.pdf
225. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (pointing to guilt proven beyond a
reasonable doubt as a bedrock principle of United States' criminal law).
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accused is considered innocent until proven guilty. 22 6 This raises the
question of whether imprisonment would be justified in a case where a
conviction depended on that reverse standard of proof. 22 7 Following a
Health and Safety Executive prosecution in 2001, David Janway Davies
was convicted under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 after one
of his employees was killed on the job, and Davies challenged his
conviction "on the grounds that Section 40 [of the Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974] was incompatible with Article 6.2 of the [ECHR]."22 8
The Court of Appeals addressed this issue, "holding that the reverse
legal burden of proof in Section 40 was compatible with the convention
as it was proportionate and justified." 2 29 In light of this issue, it is
increasingly important that the Health and Safety Executive only seek to
prosecute cases where there has been serious personal fault on the part of
the defendant.230
ii. Effect on Proposed Legislation
The Offences Act provides many principles that the United States
may seek to adopt in its PAW legislation. The United Kingdom's
prosecution practices seem neither overzealous nor ineffective. If the
United States chose to implement a model similar to that of the United
Kingdom, it should disregard the reverse burden of proof standard and
assume that all offenders are innocent until proven guilty. The United
Kingdom's model of occupational health and safety seems to suggest
that prosecutions should be reserved for those who knowingly cut
corners, as well as repeat offenders. The most important insight that the
United Kingdom model provides is how to tailor prosecutions to those
who knowingly breach occupational safety guidelines, while protecting
those business owners who comply with such standards.
B. Australia
Australia's individualistic state approach to occupational health and
safety provides another model of an approach the PAW Act may seek to

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id
See Histed, supra note 224, at 2.
Ponting, supra note 200.
Id.
See Histead, supra note 224.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol28/iss1/8

26

Rigel and Poulianos: Take Your Paws Off Me: An Argument in Favor of Revising the Occup

2010]

209

TAKE YOUR PAWS OFFME

adopt. Australia's workplace health and safety legislation includes
varying practices among states, as well as an in-depth, three-tiered
approach to occupational safety. 23 1 In Australia, the legislative powers
of the federal government are set out in the Commonwealth
Constitution,2 32 but this Constitution does not grant a "general power" to
the Commonwealth to legislate for Occupational Health and Safety
("OHS"), and consequently, Australia has implemented ten OHS
statutes.233 Specifically, five Australian jurisdictions have sought to
prosecute employers via industrial manslaughter legislation "or [have]
introduced imprisonment as a sentencing option for OHS breaches
which result in an industrial death."234 Queensland, New South Wales,
South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia, and Victoria have all
sought to implement prosecution guidelines against corporate directors
and officers for breaches of OHS legislative guidelines.235
Similar to the United Kingdom's practices, the "duty to take
reasonable care for the safety of employees is .

.

. not imposed upon

individual directors of a corporate employer" in Australia. 2 36 Similar to
the Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 in the
United Kingdom, 23 7 Australian legislation seeks to hold a corporation
liable for day-to-day practices, but does not attach liability to an
individual director.238 Additionally, similar to what occurs in the United
States and the United Kingdom, breaches of health and safety guidelines
in Australia historically have resulted in little prosecution. 23 9 However,
individual states in Australia have implemented different approaches to
231. See About Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Australia, NAT'L RESEARCH
CENTRE FOR OHS REGULATION, http://ohs.anu.edu.au/ohs/index.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
232. Id.
233. Id. Occupational health and safety legislation in Australia is comprised of ten statues,
including "six state Acts, two territory Acts, a Commonwealth Act covering Commonwealth
employees and employees of . .. corporations, and a Commonwealth Act covering the maritime
industry." Id
234. Paul Harpur, Occupational Health and Safety Issues and the Boardroom: Criminal
Penaltiesfor Directorsfor Company's Lack of Safety, CORP. GOVERNANCE EJOURNAL 4 (2008),
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context-cgej.
235. Id. at 1.
236. Karen Wheelwright, Some Care, Little Responsibility? Promoting Directors' and
Managers' Legal Accountability For OccupationalHealth and Safety in the Workplace, 10 DEAKIN
L. REV. 470,472-73 (2005) (citation omitted).
237. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, §§ 18(1)-(2) (U.K.).
238. See Wheelwright, supra note 236, at 472-73.
239. See Harpur,supra note 234, at 3 (citing to a case where management was clearly to blame
for an explosion at the company but where no directors or senior company officers were charged for
the deaths).
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prevent death and to ensure safety in the workplace. It is useful to
examine how different jurisdictions in Australia have set out legislation
pertaining to occupational health and safety to determine which practices
have helped to reduce deaths and serious accidents in the workplace.
1. Western Australia
In 2004, Western Australia implemented the Occupational Safety
and Health Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 ("Repeal
Act"), 24 0 which changed the previous Occupational Health and Safety
Act 1984241 by introducing an offense of "gross negligence" for
workplace deaths.242 Under the Repeal Act, "gross negligence" is
defined as an offense "where [a person] knew that [his] conduct would
be likely to cause the death of, or serious harm to, a person, and death
resulted." 2 4 3 The maximum penalty for an employer who is found to
have been grossly negligent is two years. 2 "
i. The Gross Negligence Standard
The gross negligence standard adopted by Western Australia for
breaches of occupational health and safety serves the purpose of
deterrence.245 The elements of a crime for gross negligence create a
standard that is "easier to satisfy than the elements for general
manslaughter.2 46
In Western Australia, both industrial and general manslaughter
require that there be a death in the workplace.247 However, the two
differ in that industrial manslaughter "attributes criminal liability for
negligent conduct, where general manslaughter requires recklessness or
criminal intent."2 48 The adoption of the negligence standard for
industrial manslaughter may result in an employer being faced with

240.
(Austl).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Occupational Safety and Health Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA)
OccupationalHealth and Safety Act 1984 (WA) (Austi.).
Harpur, supra note 234, at 5.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id
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prosecution "based upon imputed knowledge." 24 9 Additionally, states
that have adopted the gross negligence standard "have made it easier to
gain a prosecution for this offence . . . and thus have increased the

deterrent effect of industrial death provisions." 250 Therefore, this may
be a standard that OSHA should consider enacting because it sets a clear
standard for what and who may be prosecuted.
The broad stance that Western Australia takes in regard to who they
prosecute, and the fact that they prosecute those people based on
imputed knowledge, may be extremely helpful to the United States in
ensuring compliance with its OSHA standards. The proposed legislation
in the United States must include such specificities with regard to a gross
negligence standard because it will ensure efficient prosecution
practices. The Australian legislation sets out a precise means of
evaluating offenses, and such precision may mean the difference
between ensuring strict compliance and allowing employers to get away
with what they have always gotten away with: cutting corners around
health and safety guidelines.
ii. Effect on Proposal
The makeup of Australia's legislative scheme with respect to
occupational health and safety in the workplace is something the United
States should implement to ensure employees health and safety at work.
Similar to Safe Work Australia,2 51 OSHA has the administrative
capability to enforce national codes.252 Further, much like Australia's
states and territories, many states may want to implement their own
penalties with regard to workplace health and safety. These states,
however, must meet, at minimum, OSHA standards.2 53 It seems that in
some states, where there are unique types of industries, penalties for
occupational health and safety should be tailored to the specific needs of
the individual state. For example, New South Wales, a state with

249. Id
250. Id. at 7.
SAFE
WORK
AUSTRALIA,
Safe
Work
Australia,
251. See
About
http://safeworkaustralia.gov.aulAboutSafeWorkAustralia/Pages/AboutSafeWorkAustralia.aspx (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
252. See Summary of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/osha.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2010).
253. See id.
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extensive coal mining practices, 254 imposes harsh sanctions on those
who breach occupational health and safety guidelines.2 55 Similarly,
states such as Wyoming, with extensive coal mining practices,256 may
seek to adopt individualized penalties for such breaches.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTING AMERICA'S
WORKERS ACT
The United States has taken important steps toward addressing
occupational health and safety in the workplace. The late Senator
Edward Kennedy reintroduced the PAW Act 25 7 shortly before his death
in 2009.258 Kennedy had unsuccessfully sponsored the bill in the past. 25 9
A few months before Kennedy reintroduced the PAW Act in the Senate,
Representative Lynn Woolsey introduced a companion bill 2 6 0 to
Kennedy's PAW Act in an effort to reform the OSH Act.261 Together,
the proposed legislation would allow OSHA to aggressively regulate the
American workplace.262 In 2009, Congress was largely occupied with
healthcare reform, leaving both bills in committee at the end of the
year.263 Although the proposed bill has acquired support from many
individuals and organizations, opponents argue that Congress is seeking
to reform OSHA with overzealous prosecutions and harsh sentencing
guidelines.2 64

254. See New Mines & Projects in NSW- Coal, NSW GOV'T, DEP'T OF PRIMARY INDUS.,
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/minerals/resources/coal/new-mines-and-projects (last visited Dec. 19,
2010).
255. See Mine Health and Safety Act No 74 2004 (NSW) s 48 (Austi.).
256. See
27 Coal-Mining States, KY.
EDUC. TELEVISION,
http://www.wmaminelife.com/coal/coalhome.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). The amount of coal produced in
Wyoming accounts for 18% of the nation's production of coal. Id.
257. Protecting America's Workers Act, S. 1580, 111 th Cong. (2009).
258. Mary Swanton, Protecting America's Workers Act Would Give OSHA New Ammunition
Against
Employers,
INSIDE
COUNs.
(Feb.
1,
2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/February-2010/Pages/Protecting-Americas-WorkersAct-Would-Give-OSHA-New-Ammunition-Against-Employers.aspx.
259. See id.
260. Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. (2009).
261. See Swanton, supra note 258.

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16 (noting that workplace injuries are at
an all time low, companies will react negatively to higher penalties, and small companies will bear
the brunt of the higher penalties). See also Snyder, supra note 16 (interviewing a construction
industry spokesman, who believes that increasing penalties may undermine efforts to improve safety
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A. Felony Sentencing: Too Much or Too Little?
The proposed bill "would sharply increase criminal penalties" for
violations of occupational health and safety standards.265 Currently, the
maximum prison penalty for an OSHA violation resulting in death of an
employee is six months.266 This penalty increases to a maximum of oneyear imprisonment if the OSHA violation is a repeat violation. 2 6 7 As
previously discussed, the PAW Act, if passed, would extend the
maximum prison sentence to ten years, or twenty years in the case of a
repeated violation.268 Moreover, violations resulting in serious bodily
injury, but not death, would also carry stiff penalties.269 Under the
proposed legislation, a first-time willful offense resulting in serious
bodily injury would carry a prison term of up to five years, or ten years
for a repeat offender. 27 0 The current OSH Act does not contain a
criminal penalty for a willful offense resulting in serious bodily injury. 27 1
Accordingly, the criminal penalties are significantly harsher under the
new bill. Additionally, Congress would effectively elevate willful and
repeat OSHA violations from misdemeanors to felonies if the PAW Act
were passed.2 72
Classifying certain OSHA violations as felonies may be the most
contentious proposition of the PAW Act.273 The significance of
elevating OSHA sanctions to felonies from misdemeanors is that the
Department of Justice will be more likely to prosecute cases referred to
274
o
Proponents of the PAW Act assert that increased
it by OSHA.27
in the construction industry); Scott Westcott, Needed Changes or Wrong Focus?, HUM. RESOURCES
EXECUTIVE ONLINE (June 7, 2010), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/story.jsp?storyld-445779325
(interviewing attorney Jonathan Snare, who believes that the proposed changes are too focused on
penalties rather than on assisting employers to understand their obligations for workplace safety);
Letter from C. Christopher Patton, supra note 16, at 9 (commenting that overzealous prosecution
dismisses the benefits of a "meaningful negotiation and . . . settlement process" to OSHA,
employers, and employees).
265. GIBSON DUNN, supranote 9.
266. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006).
267. Id.
268. Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. § 311(a)(1) (2009).
269. Id. § 311(a)(5).
270. Id.
271. See id. § 666.
272. See GIBSON DUNN, supranote 9.
273. See Swanton, supra note 258 (quoting former OSHA head Edwin Foulke as stating,
"[c]hanging from misdemeanor charges to felonies would have the most opposition from the
business community").
274. See GIBSON DuNN, supranote 9.
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employees, as well as
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a necessary element in establishing deterrence for
but opponents argue that the proposed criminal
to increase the divide between employers and
that between businesses and government.276

1. But, I Didn't Mean to Kill My Worker!
Critics of the PAW Act argue that imprisonment for willful or
repeat OSHA violations that result in death or serious injury is too
harsh.277 However, the proposed bill will simply adopt similar criminal
sanctions that are already available at the state level.278 For example,
under the PAW Act, willful and repeat violations resulting in death are
consistent with New York State statutes that deal with criminally
negligent homicide and reckless murder. 2 79 Similar to the PAW Act,
under New York Penal Law, crimes that involve criminal negligence and
recklessness do not require the prosecutor to prove that the defendant
had an intent to kill; rather, it only requires that the prosecutor establish
that the death occurred as a result of the defendant's failure to recognize,
or the defendant's disregard of, a substantial risk.280
In New York State, criminally negligent homicide is a class E

275. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 6-8; see also DEATH ON THE JoB, supra note
10, at 1 ("OSHA penalties are too low to deter violations.").
276. See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16 (arguing that increasing penalties
may create an "adversarial posture between OSHA and an employer"); Snyder, supra note 16
(stating concerns from employers that imposing harsher sanctions would deteriorate the construction
industry's relationship with OSHA).
277. See supra Part W.A.
278. See MARK A. LIES II & MEAGAN NEWMAN, SEYFARTH, SHAW, LLP, SAFETY VIOLATIONS
COULD COST You MORE THAN YOUR MONEY-THEY MAY COST YOU YOUR FREEDOM 3 (2009),
at
available
http://www.malterassociates.com/malter/Images%5CNEWSIETTER%5CSafety/ 2OViolations.pdf
279. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.10, .15 (McKinney 2010) (providing that negligently
or recklessly causing the death of another person constitutes a felony in New York State), with
Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. § 311(a)(1) (2009) (imposing a
maximum ten-year prison sentence on an employer when the employer willfully violates the Act
and the violation causes the death of an employee).
280. Compare PENAL LAW § 15.05 (providing that a person acts recklessly "when he is aware
of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk," and acts negligently "when he
fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk"), with H.R. 2067 § 311(a)(1) (providing
criminal penalties when an employer willfully violates an OSHA standard which causes an
employee's death, rather than only providing criminal penalties when an employer purposefully
causes the death of an employee).
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felony. 28' This crime occurs when someone causes another person's
death by means of criminal negligence.2 82 New York State law defines
an act of criminal negligence as when an individual "fails to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk" inherent in his act.2 83 Second-degree
manslaughter, on the other hand, is defined as the act of "recklessly
caus[ing] the death of another person," and it is a class C felony.284 A
person acts recklessly when he perceives the substantial and
unjustifiable risk inherent in his act, but "consciously disregards" it.285
In essence, the culpable mental states of the crimes are distinguished by
whether the accused recognized a risk inherent in his act that resulted in
someone's death.2 86 Additionally, criminally negligent homicide is
punishable by up to four years in prison, while second-degree
manslaughter has a maximum sentence of fifteen years.2 87 Thus, New
York State courts punish defendants who are found to be aware of the
risk of death and disregard the risk more harshly than it does those who
fail to perceive the risk of death.
OSHA violations resulting in death should be aligned with criminal
statutes in New York that deal with criminally negligent homicide and
second-degree manslaughter through the PAW Act, because employers
who commit OSHA violations that result in death are not intentionally
killing employees. 2 8 8 However, employers are aware, or should be
aware, of the risk of death that these violations pose. 2 89 In either case, a
violating employer's general mental state has risen to culpability worthy
of punishment under New York law. 2 90 An example of this is the recent
indictment of the owner of New York Crane & Equipment Corporation
for manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide in connection with a

281. PENAL LAW § 125.10.
282. Id
283. Id. § 15.05(4).
284. Id. § 125.15.
285. Id. § 15.05(3).
286. See People v. Murphy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839 (App. Div. 1982) (distinguishing between
the culpable mental states of criminal negligence and second degree manslaughter).
287. See PENAL LAW §70.00(2)(c), (e).
288. See LIES & NEWMAN, supra note 278 (discussing two cases in which unintentional deaths
stemming from OSHA violations resulted in state charges of manslaughter, criminally negligent
homicide, assault, and reckless endangerment).
289. See Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006) (creating a
statutory duty for an employer to provide a place of employment that is "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees").
290.

See PENAL LAW § 15.05.
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crane collapse that killed two employees.29 1 Sentencing in these types of
cases is at the discretion of the court. 292 A court may find that employers
who are unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk deserve a
mitigated sentence compared to those employers who disregard such a
risk. Thus, when considering current state statues pertaining to similar
crimes, it becomes apparent that the proposed penalties under the PAW
Act are not grossly disproportionate. However, setting sentencing aside,
opponents of the PAW Act argue that other aspects of the bill may be
counterproductive to workplace regulation.
B. IncreasedCivil Penalties:I Can't andI'm Not Paying That
Critics argue that the PAW Act would have significant detrimental
economic effects on employers. First, the drastic increase in civil
penalties under the PAW Act would likely result in a simultaneous
increase in litigation against citations by large companies.2 93 Moreover,
many small companies would bear the true burden of increased civil
penalties because they lack the resources to challenge citations. 29 4
Second, the increase in civil penalties would directly affect how
295
ofcr
Compliance officers
OSHA's compliance officers allocate their time.
would be forced to spend more time on inspections in order to assure
that citations would be able to stand up to the scrutiny of litigation.296 In
addition, compliance officers would be drawn away from actually
inspecting worksites when they would be required to appear in litigation
to defend their citations.297 Thus, an increase in civil penalties
encourages litigation by large companies, hurts small businesses, and
wastes valuable inspection time.
However, the arguments against increasing civil penalties are weak.
Under the OSH Act, employers already often challenge civil citations,2 98

291. See John Eligon, Owner of Crane Company Faces Manslaughter Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2010, at Al7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/nyregion/06crane.html;
John Eligon, Charges in 2008 Crane Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2010, 2:56 PM),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/charges-in-2008-crane-collapse.
292. See PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(c), (e).
293.

See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16.

294. See id.
295. See id.
296. Id
297. Id.
298. See DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 15-17 (discussing that "employers who
contest citations . .. face lower final penalties than employers who do not").
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and citations are routinely downgraded upon contestation. 299 In fact,
employers who challenge citations are more likely to have the fines
reduced in the form of a "[c]ontest discount."30 0 Thus, an increase is
necessary to eliminate the inadequacies of the current framework and to
establish deterrence through civil penalties.
The PAW Act does not propose new regulations that would
increase costs for any specific employers or small businesses.o' While
the PAW Act does increase criminal and civil penalties, only employers
who violate regulations would incur these costs. 3 02 Moreover, the
amendments pertaining to the OSHA citation process do not create
overhead costs for employers.30 3 Additionally, OSHA currently follows
a policy of reducing citations for small businesses and employers that act
in good faith, and it anticipates continuing this policy if the PAW Act is
enacted. 3 04 Therefore, small businesses will not bear a disproportionate
brunt of civil penalties.
Finally, increases in civil penalties will not reduce the number of
inspections performed by OSHA. From fiscal years 2002 through 2009,
the number of hours spent by OSHA on safety and health violations has
only fluctuated slightly. 305 In fact, years with the highest average for
civil penalties issued for willful citations do not indicate a drop in
average hours spent by inspectors on safety or health violations.306
Based on this data, there does not appear to be a correlation between the
number of hours spent on an inspection and the amount of an OSHA
citation.

299. See id.
300. Id. at 15-16.
301. See Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. (2009) (The purpose of
the bill is "[t]o amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to expand coverage under
the Act, to increase protections for whistleblowers, to increase penalties for certain violators, and for
other purposes.").
302. See id §§ 310-311 (The proposed bill only provides for penalties to be assessed to
violators.).
303. See id. §§ 306-307 (The proposed bill does not provide any additional financial costs to
employers in these sections).
304. Kent Hoover & Michael DeMasi, Stricter Safety, PORTFOLIO.COM (May 3, 2010),
http://www.portfolio.com/business-news/2010/05/03/osha-is-increasing-penalties-for-serioussafety-violations.
305. See DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 60.
306. See id. For example, in fiscal year 2005, the average fine for a willful citation was
$43,294, while the average number of hours spent on a health violation was 34.8. Id. Meanwhile,
in fiscal year 2009, the average fine for a willful citation dropped to $34,271, but the average
number of hours spent on a health violation remained at 34.8. Id.
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C. AdversarialPosture of the PA WAct
Opponents also argue that the PAW Act would increase prosecution
and foster a defensive rather than preventive occupational safety and
During inspections, opponents argue, employers
health culture.
might be more likely to conceal unsafe
prosecution
with
threatened
working conditions or to outright refuse entrance to an inspector.307 The
creation of an adversarial relationship between employers and OSHA
would inhibit adequate safety investigations, especially in the case of a
fatality. 30s The threat of criminal prosecution would likely increase the
role of employers' attorneys in OSHA inspections and other interactions
between the agency and employer.309
Opponents of the bill also argue that the enactment of the PAW Act
would lead employers to focus on avoiding the increased penalties,
rather than remaining focused on "their obligations for workplace safety
and health."310 Further, opponents of the bill argue that statistical data
indicate a consistent drop in work-related deaths since OSHA's
inception,3 1 ' and that this trend suggests that no amendments to the OSH
311
Act are necessary.32 Critics argue that even if revisions are required,
the PAW Act does not make appropriate changes.313 A federal policy
that emphasizes prevention is preferable to one that focuses on penalties,
critics argue, and increased penalties do little to inform business owners
of their obligations under federal law. 3 14 Rather, opponents of the bill
argue that employers would be better served with materials and
307.

See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16 ("Increasing the ...

penalties will

make it far more likely that large companies will have their lawyers require OSHA to obtain a
search warrant before entering a workplace and have their attorney present during an OSHA
inspection."); Snyder, supra note 16 (quoting Brian Turmail, spokesman for the Associated General
Contractors of America, who stated that "[i]f I know I'm going to be fined or at risk because I know
there's a problem on site, I think it would actually drive safety concerns underground because I'm
going to keep quiet").
308. See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16.
309. See id (suggesting adversarial employers may have their attorneys require that OSHA
inspectors have a warrant before entering a workplace).
310. See Westcott, supra note 264 (quoting Jonathan Snare, former head of OSHA, who also
stated that "[iln my view there are better approaches to deal with the problems than those being
proposed [and t]hat would be a strategy focused more on prevention than penalties").
311. See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16. See generally DEATH ON THE JOB,
supra note 10, at 34 (indicating that workplace fatality rates have dropped from 18% of the
workforce in 1970 to only 3.8% of the workforce in 2007).
312. See COAL. FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY, supra note 16.
313. See Westcott, supranote 264.
314. Id.
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programs promoting compliance rather than a statute that creates a
greater magnitude of liability."'
Finally, opponents argue that the increased regulation proposed
under the PAW Act may result in overdeterrence. This overdeterrence,
critics argue, would drive employers away from industries most heavily
regulated by OSHA for fear of criminal liability.3 16 Alternatively,
companies may also seek to avoid prosecution by moving offshore. In
general, employers who fear prosecution may be less likely to cooperate
with OSHA or restrict activities of employees.
Nevertheless, the argument that the enactment of the PAW Act
would create a defensive culture between OSHA and employers is
without merit. The function of OSHA is to regulate the American
workplace using the power delegated to it by Congress,31 and the
relationship between OSHA and employers will always be an adversarial
one; OSHA regulates employers by threat of penalty. However, in order
for OSHA to effectively operate and achieve its purpose, it must be
properly equipped."' Currently, OSHA is not able to effectively deter
employers from violating its regulations, and since civil monetary and
criminal penalties are essentially OSHA's only methods of enforcement,
"the threat of penalties being imposed must be credible, and the penalty
itself must be high enough to prompt the employer to correct the
hazard." 3 19 Specifically, "employers will find it cheaper to risk an
OSHA penalty than spend the money to correct a safety hazard" if the
penalties are not sufficient.320 Therefore, the PAW Act is appropriate
legislation to maintain stability in the relationship between the federal
government and employers.
The argument that prosecution of employers will deter qualified
businesses and management from pursuing their interests is weak at best.
This argument assumes that prosecution of employers would be rampant
and carried out in every violation, creating a widespread fear of liability.
This is hardly the purpose of the proposed bill.32 1 Prosecution of

315. See id.; see also Letter from C. Christopher Patton, supranote 16, at 2.
316. See Snyder, supra note 16.
317. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
318. See Work Safety Advocates Push for Stronger OSHA, WASH. STATE LAB. COUNCIL (Jul.
15, 2010), http://www.wsc.org/reports/2010/July/15.htm.
319. DISCOUNTING DEATH, supra note 87, at 6.
320. Id.
321. See Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. (2009) (discussing that
one of the purposes of the bill is to "increase penalties for certainviolators" (emphasis added)).
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employers under the PAW Act would only be applied in situations
where an employer willfully or repeatedly violated an OSHA regulation
causing someone serious bodily injury or death.322 Thus, employers
would have nothing to fear, so long as they comply with mandated
federal regulations. In essence, the implementation of the PAW Act
would only create fear for those who willfully or repeatedly break the
law.
Finally, an argument citing decreasing rates of workplace related
injury and death as evidence of OSHA's effectiveness is flawed because
the statistics are flawed.32 3 Congress has only recently taken steps to
evaluate the accuracy of employer reporting methods.324 Until the
prevalence of underreporting is ascertained, it cannot be stated with
certainty that work injuries and deaths have steadily declined.325
Although the PAW Act emphasizes enforcement by increasing penalties,
it does not abandon voluntary and cooperative programs to educate
employers. 3 26 These informative programs are appropriate efforts to
supplement enforcement, rather than replace it. 32 7 However, the increase
of civil and criminal penalties is necessary to deter employers from
harmful practices, a goal that volunteer and educational programs cannot
reach on their own.
D. The Lack ofSentencing Guidelines:Problems and Proposals
A major shortcoming of the PAW Act is the absence of sentencing
guidelines, which creates uncertainty as to who has discretion to
determine a sentence for the most serious repeat and willful violations.
Both OSHA and federal judges may claim the authority to determine an

322. See id.§ 311.
323. See supra Part II.C.3. See generally HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115, at 2
("[E]xtensive evidence from academic studies, media reports and worker testimony shows that
work-related injuries and illnesses in the United States are chronically and even grossly
underreported.").
324. See U.S. WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 127, at 1. This governmental
report reviews the Department of Labor's efforts to ensure that workplace injuries are properly and
accurately recorded by employers.
325. See generally HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 115 (providing specific examples where it is
believed that the decrease of reported work-related injuries can be attributed to deficiencies in
recordkeeping).
326. DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 10, at 17 ("Voluntary programs still are part of the OSHA
program but are viewed as supplemental to, not a replacement for enforcement.").
327. See id.; see also Letter from C. Christopher Patton, supra note 16, at 2.
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employer's sentence.3 28 The PAW Act should include a clarification as
to who has the authority to declare a sentence and what factors should be
considered in forming punishment.
Another flaw of the PAW Act is the absence of any guidelines to
effectively tailor prosecutions to those employers most deserving of
prosecution. The most important part of effectuating the new sentences
is to tailor prosecutions to individuals most deserving of the stiff
penalties proposed under the pending legislation.32 9 Prosecutions based
on criminally negligent and reckless behavior in the workplace are a
good starting point to determine who should be prosecuted. For
example, in the United Kingdom, corporations are prosecuted when they
breach a duty of care, and the breach causes an employee's death.330
This duty of care is owed under the law of negligence. Further, a
director, manager, or worker can be prosecuted if he fails "to take
reasonable care for the health and safety of himself and of other persons
who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work." 33 1 Thus, in the
United Kingdom, the responsibility for occupational health and safety
falls not only on the employer but on the individual employee as well.
Similarly, the proposed legislation in the United States would seek
to sanction employers who fail to take the necessary precautions to
prevent an employee's death.332 The question is not whether there
should be prosecutions but rather when there should be prosecutions. In
Australia, for example, Neil Gunningham, the Director of the National
Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation of
Australian National University, suggests that different types of firms are
likely to react differently to increased prosecution. 333 For example,
Gunningham states that it is different to prosecute a key decision maker
in a small business than it is to prosecute a senior officer in a large
328. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2006)
(authorizing the creation of an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out
adjudicatory functions under the Act); id. § 660 ("Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an
order of the Commission . . . may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of
appeals . . .").
329. See Neil Gunningham, Prosecutionfor OHS Offences: Deterrent or Disincentive?, 29
at
370
(2007),
available
L.
REv.
359,
SYDNEY
http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/ngunningham/publications/PDFs/2007_GunninghamPDD SLR.pdf
330.
331.
332.
311(a)(1)
333.

See supra Part II.A.2.
See Health and Safety at Work etc Act, 1974, c. 37, § 7 (U.K.).
See Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111' Cong.
(2009).
See Gunningham, supranote 329, at 370.
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company who might not be directly responsible for the death or serious
injury that occurred.334 Perhaps the most important of Gunningham's
suggestions is that we must recognize that prosecutions do not work
universally and instead should be carefully targeted to appropriate
circumstances and actors that are likely to respond positively to it. 335
The United States would also be wise to look at the United
Kingdom's sentencing standards, which are tailored to each individual
situation,336 in determining its own sentencing standards. In the United
Kingdom, the Judge considers how foreseeable the injury was, and
whether there were any particular aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. 337 Additionally, the judge is advised to "[c]onsider the
nature, financial organisation and resources of the defendant." 33 8
Additionally, Gunningham notes that some failures on the part of a duty
holder expose others to substantial risk of serious harm, while other
Consequently, those who are found
failures are far less harmful. 3
liable for multiple breaches are deemed prime candidates for stricter
penalties, because repeated breaches give rise to significant risk.340
Accordingly, OSHA should take into account the defendant's past
OSHA record when determining sentencing guidelines. Finally, it is
important to note that prosecution may have a negative impact when it is
inappropriately used. For example, evidence from Australia has shown
that a "confrontational style of enforcement may diminish the
willingness of firms to cooperate and learn from past experience[s]." 34 1
Finally, another major shortcoming of the OSH Act and the
proposed PAW Act is that they fail to provide specific guidelines about
an individual employee's responsibilities in the workplace. While the
OSH Act focuses on the responsibility of the employer, legislation
abroad has sought to hold an individual employee responsible for their
conduct in the workplace.3 42 The United States should follow the United
Kingdom's lead in ensuring that responsibility for health and safety
While
violations extend to every individual in the workplace.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
financial
339.
340.

See id.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.2.
CorporateManslaughter,supra note 206 (advising judges to consider factors such as the
consequences of a fine, compensation for the injury, and all circumstances of the case).
Gunningham, supra note 329, at 377-78.
See id. at 378.

341. Id. at 369.
342. See supraPart III.A. 1.
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individuals in the workplace should take reasonable precautions to
ensure that the workplace remains safe, the only way to make certain
employees take this responsibility seriously is to punish those who do
not.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly the OSH Act is in need of reformation. The current conflict
between deterrence and negotiation policies has crippled OSHA's ability
to effectively regulate the American workplace. The downgrading of
citations against offending employers has proven to be detrimental in
maintaining compliance with OSHA standards, and the relabeling of
citations as "unclassified" has eliminated the ability of OSHA to keep
and maintain accurate history of repeat offenders. OSHA's civil
penalties are equally weak because they do not account for inflation
rates. Perhaps most discouraging is the extremely limited amount of
prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice against employers
who commit violations resulting in serious injury or death.
While the current situation seems bleak, the PAW Act promises
much needed reformation. The bill provides deterrence for willful and
repeat violations by creating felonies that will make employers consider
the consequences of failing to protect their employees. In addition, the
PAW Act strengthens civil penalties by significantly increasing fines
and accounting for inflation. Finally, the proposed legislation empowers
employees by giving them a greater role in the punishment of employers.
Although several arguments have been made against the increased
penalties in the PAW Act, they are largely unsubstantiated. Longer
sentences are justified given that current state law prescribes for similar
punishment in cases of reckless murder or criminally negligent
homicide. Moreover, the argument that prosecution of employers is
counterproductive is unfounded. The PAW Act does not increase
burdensome financial expenses for small businesses; rather, it provides
more protection for employees. Also, the PAW Act does not damage the
relationship between OSHA and employers, as this relationship is
naturally adversarial. Finally, the proposed bill will not over deter
employers from pursuing their interests because only repeat and willful
violators should be deterred by these new punishments.
The PAW Act, however, lacks specific sentencing guidelines,
which will inevitably lead to problems in several different areas. In
order to effectuate the harsher sanctions, Congress must keep in mind
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the cultural apathy that lies in the prosecution of business owners.
Prosecution guidelines must be tailored to the individual offenders to
ensure that the imposition of prison sentences is not abused. Moreover,
the lack of sentencing guidelines creates confusion as to who has
authority in determining employer's sentences. Finally, the PAW Act
makes no clear delineation between the responsibilities of the employer
and employee.
Looking to occupational health and safety legislation abroad, it is
clear that the PAW Act must include additional provisions that
effectuate occupational health and workplace safety enforcement.343 In
the United Kingdom, under the Health and Safety Offences Act, judges
are given the inherent authority to enforce prosecutions, but they must
also comply with standards set up by the Sentencing Advisory Panel. 34
Accordingly, the United States should follow suit in establishing
sentencing power for an OSHA violation. Further, in the United
Kingdom, responsibility for maintenance of a safe and healthy
workplace extends to the individual employee.345 The United States
could benefit from adopting this idea. Individuals in the American
workplace should pay close attention to their specific duties in relation
to health and safety in the workplace to ensure that effective systems and
procedures are being facilitated.
Finally, the most important lesson to be learned from legislation
abroad is the importance of sentencing guidelines. In Australia, an
individual state is responsible for setting occupational health and safety
guidelines.34 6 This ensures that in states with dangerous industries, state
governments have more of a role in facilitating punishment for health
and safety breaches.347 While the makeup of OHS in Australia, differs

343. See supra Part III.A.2.ii.
344. See supra Part III.A.2.
345. See supra Part III.A.2.
346. See Gunningham, supranote 329, at 359-60.
347. See id (giving New South Wales as an example of a state with a dangerous industry
where legislation effectuates harsher sentences because there is a higher risk of workplace
accidents).
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from that of OSHA in the United States, the idea of tailoring prosecution
to those who are most deserving of sanction cannot be ignored. In
providing specific sentencing guidelines, the United States will ensure
that implementation of harsher sanctions will deter those who knowingly
cut corners around occupational health and safety guidelines.
Although the absence of sentencing guidelines in the PAW Act
The
creates several problems, these conflicts can be resolved.
observation of workplace regulation abroad provides a reference for the
United States in reforming the OSH Act. Moreover, the lack of sound
arguments against the PAW Act, in combination with the obvious need
for reform, has proven that the proposed bill must be enacted.
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